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Crying Over the Inferred Existence of Spilled 
Milk:  The Demonstrable Illogic of  
Ortega v. Kmart 
Paul K. Hoffman* and Norman L. Geisler** 
If it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn’t, it 
ain’t.  That’s logic. 
—Tweedledee, Alice in Wonderland 
Richard Ortega was not an observant fellow.  Ordinarily, 
this shortcoming works against a litigant, but not in his case.  
Perhaps he was simply lucky enough to hire a very good lawyer 
or clever enough to actually trick the California Supreme Court.  
Either way, he more than made up for a lack of perceptive skills 
by securing a stunning change in the law of storekeeper liability.  
Stunning, because basic rules of logic were violated by the court 
when crafting its decision in Ortega v. Kmart.1 
While shopping at Kmart, Mr. Ortega was injured when he 
slipped and fell.2  Apparently he did not see the puddle of milk 
directly in his path.3  Worse still, he made no inspection or 
assessment of the milk as he lay there on the floor.  Was it cold 
and fresh?  Was it old and stinky?  Had it dried around the edges 
of the puddle or turned into cottage cheese?  He didn’t notice.  
Consequently, when Mr. Ortega sued Kmart and brought the 
claim to trial, no one could say how long the milk had been on the 
floor.4  Because Kmart had failed to inspect the store before the 
accident, the spill, in theory, could have been there a couple 
hours.  But it was equally possible that the milk appeared just 
seconds before Mr. Ortega fell.  Simply put, the length of time the 
dangerous condition existed was a mystery, and still is. 
* Attorney; Adjunct Professor of Law, Trinity Law School; B.A. in Economics, 
Westmont College; J.D., University of California at San Francisco, Hastings College of the 
Law; M.A. in Religion, Southern Evangelical Seminary. 
** Provost and Distinguished Professor of Apologetics, Veritas Evangelical Seminary; 
B.A. in Philosophy, Wheaton College; M.A. in Theology, Wheaton Graduate School; Th.B., 
William Tyndale College; Ph.D. in Philosophy, Loyola University; author or co-author of 
more than 70 books, including COME, LET US REASON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGICAL 
THINKING (1990). 
1 Ortega v. Kmart, 36 P.3d 11 (Cal. 2001). 
2 Id. at 14. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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To the dismay of retailers everywhere, Mr. Ortega’s inability 
to establish the amount of time that the dangerous condition 
actually existed set the stage for a change in the law of 
storekeeper liability that literally defies logic.  Before Ortega, the 
applicable law was both reasonable and straightforward.  
Storekeepers were held liable for injuries caused by dangerous 
conditions only if they had actual knowledge of the condition and 
failed to clean it up.5  And if the storekeeper claimed ignorance, 
the injured customer could satisfy the required element of 
knowledge by proving that the dangerous condition had existed 
long enough for a reasonable storekeeper to have discovered and 
corrected it.  This principle of law is known as “constructive 
knowledge,”6 and it is eminently sensible.  If it is known that a 
reasonable storekeeper would have discovered and corrected a 
longstanding dangerous condition, it is certainly reasonable to 
impute knowledge of the longstanding condition to the 
storekeeper.  So, for example, had Mr. Ortega demonstrated that 
the puddle of milk had begun to dry and turn to cottage cheese, 
he would have proven its longstanding existence and thereby 
imputed knowledge of the condition to Kmart. 
But such was not the case.  As noted, no one knew how long 
the milk had been there.7  Consequently, Kmart had no actual or 
constructive knowledge that the puddle even existed.  And 
naturally, one must know a spill exists before one can be 
obligated by law to clean it up.  In short, a thing must actually 
exist before it can be known to exist.  And so, under the old rule, 
Kmart could not be held liable. 
We may surmise from the high court’s opinion that Mr. 
Ortega’s lawyer responded with an argument along these lines: 
But hold on, we clearly know that the spill actually existed, otherwise 
my client would not have been injured.  The only question is how long 
the spill was there.  And it’s Kmart’s fault that no one knows since it 
failed to properly inspect the store.  Had it made regular inspections, 
who knows, it might have found the spill, cleaned it up, and prevented 
my client’s injury. 
Arguments of the woulda-coulda-shoulda variety ordinarily 
carry little weight in the courtroom.  But not in this case.  The 
California Supreme Court was impressed, so impressed, in fact, 
that it constructed a rule of law shared by no other state.8  
 5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1981). 
 6 See, e.g., Hatfield v. Levy Bros., 117 P.2d 841, 845–46 (Cal. 1941); Louie v. 
Hagstrom's Food Stores, 184 P.2d 708, 711 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947). 
 7 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 8 The Ortega court's reasoning, and the rule it yielded, were undeniably unique, 
though the decision in Glover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 536 P.2d 401 (Okla. Civ. App. 
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Ortega v. Kmart was, undoubtedly, an effort by the high court to 
remedy the perceived inequity of the storekeeper always 
benefiting—and the customer always suffering—from the parties’ 
lack of information.  Surely, some customers may have been 
injured by long-standing dangerous conditions but were 
precluded from recovery simply because no one could 
demonstrate how long the condition had existed.  Moreover, 
storekeepers are often the only source of such information.  The 
specter of storekeepers suppressing such evidence was always a 
realistic concern. 
But the California Court leveled the playing field by ruling 
that evidence of the lack of an inspection could be used to fill the 
gap in the customer’s case.9  The gap to be filled was the 
storekeeper’s knowledge of the dangerous condition.  Obviously, a 
storekeeper who is remiss in making safety inspections will have 
no knowledge of existing dangerous conditions.  In one sense, it 
actually worked to the storekeeper’s benefit to refrain from 
making inspections.  Ignorance, it would seem, was not only 
bliss, but legally advantageous.  Addressing the perceived 
injustice that may befall Mr. Ortega and those similarly situated, 
the court framed the issue and announced its ruling as follows: 
The question here is: If the plaintiff has no evidence of the source of 
the dangerous condition or the length of time it existed, may the 
plaintiff rely solely on the owner’s failure to inspect the premises 
within a reasonable period of time in order to establish an inference 
that the defective condition existed long enough for a reasonable 
person exercising ordinary care to have discovered it?  We conclude 
that the evidence of the owner’s failure to inspect the premises within 
a reasonable period of time is sufficient to allow an inference that the 
condition was on the floor long enough to give the owner the 
opportunity to discover and remedy it.10 
1974), was arguably similar in some respects.  Like the Ortega court, the Glover court 
ruled that constructive notice may be imputed in the absence of evidence establishing the 
length of time the condition existed. Id. at 408–09.  But it did so for reasons that are not 
clearly stated.  Moreover, it did not contend that the absence of an inspection permits an 
inference regarding the actual amount of time the condition existed.  Ortega is also 
plainly distinguishable from decisions in a handful of states where, for public policy 
reasons, the courts shift the burden of proof to the storekeeper regarding the amount of 
time the condition existed once the plaintiff establishes that the dangerous condition was 
reasonably predictable or of a type that commonly occurred in the defendant's premises.  
For example, in both Bozza v. Vornado, 200 A.2d 777, 779–81 (N.J. 1964) and Jasko v. 
F.W. Woolworth, 494 P.2d 839, 840–41 (Colo. 1972), the courts held that it was 
appropriate to require the defendants to come forward with proof that the dangerous 
condition would occur.  The Ortega court did not purport to adopt a new burden-shifting 
policy. 
 9 Id. at 13. 
 10 Id. 
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Now, under Ortega, the undisciplined storekeeper has no 
hiding place.  The lack of an inspection may be presented to a 
jury as evidence from which they may, by 9-to-12 votes, 
collectively “infer” a period of time that the dangerous condition 
is deemed to have actually existed.  For example, if there is no 
evidence of how long the condition actually existed, but there is 
evidence that no inspection was done for a two-hour period before 
the accident, the jury may infer that the dangerous condition 
actually existed the full two hours.  Two hours’ time is more than 
enough to impute constructive knowledge of the condition to the 
storekeeper, and thus the element of notice is satisfied; the gap 
in the customer’s case is filled. 
It is important to note that Ortega created new law not by 
modifying the rules of evidence, but by adopting a novel legal 
fiction.  The court did not deem the absence of an inspection to be 
relevant evidence of the storekeeper’s knowledge of the 
dangerous condition, for it clearly is not.  Instead, the Court 
ruled that where there is no evidence of the length of time the 
dangerous condition existed, the absence of an inspection may 
then be used by the jury to “infer” an actual period of time the 
condition existed and so impute knowledge to the storekeeper.11  
This is a legal fiction, and it precisely fits the definition offered 
by Black’s Law Dictionary: 
An assumption that something is true even though it may be untrue, 
made esp. in judicial reasoning to alter how a legal rule operates.12 
Most legal fictions have a rational connection to some 
established legal principle,13 but the fiction embraced by the 
Ortega court does not.  It is plainly false—and, in that sense, 
irrational to suggest—that the absence of an inspection 
constitutes probative evidence from which one can infer the 
amount of time the uninspected condition actually existed.  For 
what it’s worth, it is true that one may logically infer a range of 
time in which the condition could have existed.  The inferred 
range of time will always run from (a) the time of the last known 
inspection to (b) the moment before the accident occurred.  But it 
is quite impossible to reasonably infer from the absence of an 
inspection the actual amount of time the dangerous condition in 
fact existed.  To arbitrarily posit its actual existence for two 
hours simply because it could have existed two hours is not a 
rational inference. 
 11 Ortega, 36 P.3d at 13. 
 12 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 913 (8th ed. 2004). 
 13 For example, the legal fiction of constructive trust is imposed where a wrongdoer 
has acquired bare legal title to property.  The fiction of a trust is rational since the only 
element missing from an ordinary trust is the amicable intent of the parties. Id. at 1547. 
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The illogic of Ortega is all the more troubling when viewed in 
its full context of constructing a theory for imputing knowledge to 
a storekeeper.  Recall, a storekeeper cannot be held liable in tort 
without knowledge of the dangerous condition.  He is deemed to 
have knowledge of the condition if it has actually existed for a 
sufficient period of time.14  But with Ortega we are asked to 
accept the bootstrapping notion that the dangerous condition is 
deemed to have actually existed long enough to impute 
knowledge.15  Playing with epistemology—what we can know—is 
a common practice of the judiciary.  But monkeying with 
metaphysics—what really exists—opens up a whole new universe 
of problems. 
I.  PUTTING ORTEGA TO THE TEST 
The rule in Ortega is demonstrably illogical in two respects.  
First, the rule cannot be applied to real-world facts in a coherent 
and valid series of truth functional propositions (e.g., If P then Q; 
If Q then R; P; therefore R).  Second, when stated as a categorical 
syllogism, the Ortega inference violates what is traditionally 
identified as the fourth rule of categorical syllogisms: an 
affirmative conclusion cannot follow from a negative premise.16  
All men are Mortal; Socrates is a Man; Therefore, Socrates is 
Mortal, is a classic example of a sound categorical syllogism.  But 
the rule in Ortega is akin to mangling this argument by 
declaring, All men are mortal; Angels are not mortal; Socrates is 
Not an angel; therefore, Socrates is a man.  The conclusion, 
though true, does not follow from the premises.  Given the truth 
of the first three premises, Socrates could just as well be a puddle 
of spilled milk.  Let us then learn from Mr. Ortega and be careful 
where we step as we first examine the rule’s coherence. 
A. The Ortega rule is incoherent 
Unlike the rule in Ortega, the old rule—imputing 
constructive knowledge of longstanding dangerous conditions—
can be stated as a coherent series of truth functional 
propositions.  First, the key terms must be defined: 
 14 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 15 Ortega, 36 P.3d at 18 (allowing the plaintiff to use circumstantial evidence to 
prove that the dangerous condition existed for an unreasonable time by providing 
evidence that an inspection had not been made within a particular period of time prior to 
the accident, which warranted the inference that the defective condition existed long 
enough so that a store employee would have discovered it with reasonable care, thereby 
establishing the constructive knowledge standard). 
 16 PATRICK J. HURLEY, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 268–69 (5th ed. 1994); 
MORRIS R. COHEN & ERNEST NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 78–79 (1962). 
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Let “C” stand for the actual existence of a longstanding dangerous 
condition 
Let “K” stand for the storekeeper’s knowledge of the dangerous 
condition 
Let “L” stand for the storekeeper being liable to the injured party. 
Having defined these terms, the old rule, presented in symbolic 
logic, is as follows: 
If C then K    or   C  K 
If K then L      K  L 
C, therefore L     C  L 
The rule is valid since the conclusion follows from the premises.  
And, arguably, it is also sound (i.e., true) since the premises 
(given the appropriate facts) are actually true. 
By contrast, there is simply no way to coherently state the 
rule in Ortega, since to arrive at the conclusion of an affirmative 
“C” one must, at some point in the argument, interpose an 
arbitrary reversal of the initial necessary condition of  “not K” 
(~K).  The initial condition of ~K is necessary since it is stated by 
the Court as the very reason for implementing the rule in Ortega.  
In other words, since we do not know how long the dangerous 
condition existed we cannot say that the storekeeper had any 
knowledge of the dangerous condition and, consequently, cannot 
hold the storekeeper liable for the customer’s injuries under the 
old rule.  Remember, the very purpose of the rule in Ortega is to 
arrive at the conclusion that the dangerous condition actually 
existed long enough to impute constructive knowledge.17  Thus, 
the beginning point of the analysis is the presumed fact that the 
storekeeper has no actual or constructive knowledge of the 
dangerous condition.  Accordingly, we must begin to state the 
rule in Ortega by first asserting that “~ K” is true.  We must also 
introduce a new term, the storekeeper’s inspection of the 
premises.  So, we will let “I” stand for the storekeeper conducting 
reasonable inspections of the store.  The other terms are as 
stated in the old rule.  Here then is Ortega’s formulation of the 
presumed conditions that lead to the rule: 
~K   (~I  C) 
~K 
  ~I  C 
 17 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
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In narrative form, the argument for the rule is the following: 
If the storekeeper has no knowledge of the dangerous condition (~K), 
then, if he did not conduct a reasonable inspection (~I) we may 
reasonably infer that the dangerous condition actually existed long 
enough to impute knowledge of its existence (C).  We know that the 
storekeeper had no knowledge (~K); therefore, if the storekeeper did 
not perform a proper inspection (~I) we may then infer the actual 
existence of the dangerous condition for a period of time sufficient to 
impute constructive knowledge (C). 
Thus the rule in Ortega, simply put, is ~I  C, and it is based on 
the initial condition of ~K. 
The problem arises when the rule is applied to real facts.  
Here is how the rule was applied to the real facts of the Ortega 
case: 
~I   C  {the Ortega rule} 
C   K  {the old rule} 
K   L 
~I  {the facts} 
  L 
Notice that in applying the Ortega rule one must interpose a 
reversal of the presumed initial condition of ~K.  Through slight 
of hand, the acknowledged ~K becomes K.  Reversing a presumed 
fact is, of course, logically incoherent.  Thus, the rule cannot be 
coherently applied in the real world. 
B.  The Ortega rule is invalid 
Moreover, as noted above, there is no way to apply the rule 
in Ortega under a categorical syllogism without improperly 
drawing an affirmative conclusion from a negative premise.  The 
legal conclusion of any application of the rule will always be: 
“Therefore, the dangerous condition actually existed long enough 
to impute constructive knowledge.”  This type of statement is 
known as a universal affirmative proposition, or a Type A 
categorical statement.  But one of the premises in any syllogism 
intended to support this conclusion will always be: “The 
storekeeper did not conduct proper inspections.”  This is a 
universal negative proposition, or Type E statement.  And the 
fourth rule of categorical syllogisms provides that no affirmative 
conclusion can follow from a negative premise.  That is, one 
simply cannot formulate a valid syllogistic argument 
incorporating a negative premise while drawing a positive 
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conclusion.18  And yet, there is no other way of attempting to 
apply the rule in Ortega.  Of necessity, one must always assert 
that the storekeeper did not conduct a safety inspection and, as a 
result, the jury is then free to conclude that the dangerous 
condition did actually exist long enough to impute constructive 
knowledge.  Consequently, the rule in Ortega is both functionally 
and inherently illogical. 
II.  LESSONS FROM ORTEGA 
There are two lessons to be learned here.  The first is that 
due consideration should be given to incorporating the study of 
logic in standard law school curricula.  Lawyers and law students 
tend to be natural rhetoricians who instinctively emphasize 
pathos over logos.  But litigating with logos is essential for the 
stability of the law if not our entire culture.  And it is an acquired 
skill.  Accordingly, thinking correctly should be emphasized in 
the education of lawyers and judges at least as much as arguing 
effectively. 
The second lesson is not a new one: judicial candor is the 
best policy.  It appears that the California Supreme Court was 
not entirely candid in the way it approached this case and, 
predictably, got caught in a web of non-sequiturs.  The members 
of the court surely recognized the falsity of their key assertion, 
“the evidence of defendant’s failure to inspect the premises 
within a reasonable period of time prior to the accident . . . 
creates a reasonable inference that the dangerous condition 
existed long enough for it to be discovered by the owner.”19  
Though useful in constructing a rule that favors shoppers and 
encourages storekeepers’ diligence, the proposition is plainly 
false. 
Employing an obviously false premise in an argument is not 
rational.  But declaring a desired change in public policy is.  
Instead of constructing a novel legal argument to support a 
desired outcome, a straightforward declaration by the court that 
it wished to join those states that shift the burden of proof to 
undisciplined storekeepers would have been plainly rational.  
Anti-business, some might say, but nonetheless rational. 
Perhaps the justices embraced the illogic of their new rule 
for fear of being labeled liberal activists, a moniker imposed, with 
some justification, upon courts that presumptuously circumvent 
 18 HURLEY, supra note 16, at 268–69; COHEN & NAGEL, supra note 16, at 78–79. 
 19 Ortega, 36 P.3d at 18. 
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the legislative process.20  But the price they paid was dear.  In an 
ostensible effort to clarify existing law and so avoid the 
appearance of implementing radical change, the high court 
damaged its integrity by positing as true something that is not 
true.21 
Let us then be certain of this fact.  The existence of anything, 
including spilled milk, cannot be inferred from the absence of an 
inspection meant to discover that thing.  On the other hand, as 
the aging Justice Holmes once suggested, “the law is what judges 
say it is.”22  Jurisprudential theories aside, a state supreme court 
undeniably has the power of judicial fiat.  Accordingly, if it does 
not like the social consequences of a given law—such as the rule 
that allows storekeepers to escape liability when no one knows 
how long the dangerous condition actually existed—it should 
plainly say so and, if so inclined, forthrightly implement the 
desired change.  In other words, either show some backbone or 
leave social engineering to the legislature.  And naturally, in our 
democratic society, the latter is preferable if not morally 
obligatory. 
 20 See, e.g., George W. Bush, Governor of Texas, The First Gore-Bush Presidential 
Debate (Oct. 3, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.debates.org/index.php? 
page=october-3-2000-transcript). 
 21 Using the categorical syllogism argument above, the Ortega court created a rule 
that is against logic.  The Court essentially created a legal fiction that “alter[s] how a 
legal rule operates.” See supra notes 12, 16 and accompanying text. 
 22 Brian East, Struggling to Fulfill Its Promise:  The ADA at 15, 68 TEX. BAR J. 614, 
617 (2005). 
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